Nukes over America
As reported by Military Times, most are now aware that the U. S. Air Force unknowingly transported six nuclear weapons on a B-52 bomber from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale AFB in Louisiana. This means, necessarily, that for some period of time those six weapons were not under control, at least not under the sort of two person control that nuclear weapons and nuclear related items are normally under. Since they thought they were transporting six demilitarized cruise missiles, probably Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM N), it is likely that the bomber crew had no idea they were transporting nuclear weapons. So, there were no normal nuclear security precautions on board the aircraft. This was a huge loss of security and undoubtedly several careers will be ended over this incident.
Having said that, we flew nuclear weapons over the United States for decades without incident, so there is little need to get overly upset. However, this does bring up an interesting discussion about nuclear weapon control that Peter Feaver often discusses in his writing on nuclear proliferation. He argues that we must control further proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology because many of the countries that have such weapons or want such weapons have pathologies in their civil military relations. That means there are serious issues with the ability of the military to be adequately controlled by the civilian authority.
What does that have to do with this case. No one seriously believes that six nucs got lost over America and they threatened world peace. What it points out is that in a country with air tight security over nuclear weapons we can experience a lapse. How much more likely is it in a country with a poor record of such security (e.g., Russia, Pakistan) for such incidents to occur.
Nuclear terrorism is a serious issue and incidents like this must keep us ever vigilant to ensure we keep the reins very tight on nucs, not just here, but across the globe.
September 5th, 2007 at 7:46 pm
Calling this a “lapse” is a bit much, given the extensive safeguards on nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal. The “two person” control you mention is for arming and launching weapons; these were never activated for launch, nor could they have been given the circumstances. And even if the worst case scenario took place (a plane crash), the packaging is ruggedized to prevent any leakage of radioactive material.
Security measures are so dramatically improved today compared to the early days of the MANHATTAN PROJECT, when Army soldiers disguised as civilian salesmen transported weapons-grade Uranium-235 from Oak Ridge, TN to Los Alamos, NM in gold-lined briefcases aboard civilian trains (via Chicago).
The fact that (A) the incident was immediately noted and reported to the National Command Authority — probably before the bomber even touched down; (B) that the Commander in question was relieved of command immediately; and (C) that positive control was reestablished AND the incident reported to the media just a few days later are all indicative of the strength of the republic and its military.
How many nuclear powers do you think would be so forthcoming of such a “lapse”?
September 5th, 2007 at 7:59 pm
My issue is not how we handled the issue, but to point out that if we, a country with, as you point out, a very strong system of managing nuclear weapons, has a momentary loss of control, how much more likely is it that another country (e.g., Russia or Pakistan) might have such a “lapse.” This is a powerful reason for non-proliferation and a strong argument against the “proliferation optimists” like Kenneth Waltz who see more nucs as a good thing for international security. We have a healthy civil-military relationship that ensures “lapses” are reported and dealt with quickly and openly. Another country with a pathological civ-mil relationship would be far less likely to (1) know they had a lapse, (2) deal with it quickly, or (3) ensure that the weapon was safe during the “lapse.”