American civil-military relations are not well studied within political science. Even the trauma of Vietnam failed to instigate much creative research. The collapse of colonial empires and the increase of military coups in parts of the world initiated significant interest by comparativists in third world civil-military relations and he recent fall of the Soviet Union has energized research on Eastern European matters, but despite some excellent work in the sociological field (Janowitz, 1971; Moskos, 1988), little has been done by political scientists with American civil-military relations.

Huntington’s classic Soldier and the State (1957), while not the first study of civil military relations in the United States following World War II, certainly had the most impact. He worried about the sudden presence of a post war large standing army, something not before seen in American history, posed a theory of civil-military relations of separate civilian and military worlds. Assuming the civilian politicians were the masters of the military world, it also assumed that a professional, apolitical military would have a free hand within its own world. By this separate military professionalism the civil military problematique (maintaining a military effective enough to defend the state yet not able to threaten the state) would be solved. Later, Feaver (1997) would challenge Huntington’s understanding of Cold War civil-military relations by asking whether Huntington’s predictions actually came true and offered a theory based on agency theory.

Feaver’s agency theory begins with an institutional approach to studying American civil-military relations. He examines the relationship between the civilian authorities and the military leadership. Comparing historical events to his theory then enable one to understand under which conditions the military will “work” (do the administrations bidding) or “shirk” (do what is in the military’s own best interests. Other study reveals that gaps in the attitudes of civilians and military officers may explain much as to why the military will follow orders when some might expect them to not obey. This will reveal itself in the decision to go to war in Iraq.

There it sits, though, with little progress. With the war in Iraq facing us now and the future (and probably inappropriately named) “Global War on Terror,” issues relating to the relations between the civilian political authorities and the military leadership have already caused a stir. APD offers a unique method to explore how our past may provide a means to find the future. APD’s overall strength lies in holding that politics are historically constructed and that institutions, as well as their development, explain much. It sees history as more than just a source of data. “History matters.” Timing and sequence (Pierson, 2000) are important and may well provide a key to understanding politics. Micro views, such as behavioralism produces, often hide the larger picture. Institutions and power arrangements independently affect political outcomes. Thus, in the civil-military world, studying the institutions and the dynamics created by them will provide insight to the solution.

So how do we look at history and how does that help us with American civil-military relations. When Clinton took office, several well-publicized events occurred that appeared to indicate a disdain on the part of the civilian administration for things military. Stories of uniformed officers being ill-treated by White House staff circulated in military circles widely. The Clinton attempt to permit homosexuals in the military was greeted with open horror by senior military officials and subsequently defeated. The first Clinton choice for Secretary of Defense failed and was then replaced by a Republican in an attempt to reconcile. From that point on it can be argued that the Clinton White House, for the most part, did not provide adequate civilian control of the military.

Fast forward to the arrival of Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense. Because of the perceived lack of civilian control of the military and Rumsfeld’s desire (probably correct) to transform the military from a Cold War entity to a more modern, agile, technically proficient force, he launched into a major program of bringing the Pentagon once again under the firm hand of civilian control. The details of that subjugation are not part of this discussion, but the result is that the senior military leadership was, by 2002, well under the authority of the Secretary of Defense and the President of the United States.

When decisions were being made to decide to invade Iraq, despite well known and vocal arguments by senior generals and admirals, the administration overruled the advice and ordered the invasion. That senior military officers obeyed the orders despite misgivings is explained by Feaver and Kohn (2001) as a very real difference in how civilians and military officers understand issues of legality and ethics. Much more work is necessary here, as an argument can be made that one factor in making the decision to invade Iraq was inadequate civilian control of the military followed by too much civilian control of the military. APD offers a way to explore this from a multi-disciplinary approach – behavioral, institutional, rational choice, and historical.

APD’s interests in “seeing the forest despite the trees” often give it a means to understand change and not just order. It has a history of being driven by theory, i.e., not being afraid to use political and social theory to frame questions and guide research. Additionally, APD is unique in its propensity to focus at the institutional level of analysis, paying close attention to agency and the impact of individuals and concentrating on how institutions themselves structure individual preferences and choices. It is apparent that American military institutions do affect individual preferences and choices, even to the point of decisions as to how to use military power and under what circumstances it is permissible to “push back” against their civilian masters.

The existence of an autarchic, fundamentally illiberal institution (the military) inside a larger liberal democratic institution (the United States) is puzzling. More puzzling is how certain liberal ideals are maintained by members of the military while participating in (and believing strongly in) their organization. Some recent literature exploring just such issues may provide for the basis of future research. The “cultural critique” literature of APD, alternatively known as the submerged histories or liberalism and its challengers, offer helpful insights into how illiberal philosophies can exist side by side with liberalism, often in the same person. Burgess (1891) and Wilson (1885) argue opposite points about separation of power and checks and balances (Burgess thinking the liberal democracy was healthy, and Wilson believing that a stronger central government like the British parliamentary system was necessary to solve American pathologies.)

Smith (1993), asked us to consider examining the American political experience not from a Tocquevillian premise of an exclusively liberal democratic tradition, but to see it as having multiple traditions. Showing how such illiberal philosophies as patriarchy, racism, and nativism (Americanism) can exist simultaneously with the traditional liberal ideals, often in the same people, offers the potential for an exciting avenue to explore the American civil-military relationship.

As a result of a vigorous debate within APD scholarship, a new consensus is beginning to develop that understands how political power is wielded and the part that institutions and ideas have in shaping the result (Orren and Skowronek, 2004). APD attempts to understand institutions “in-time.” This covers all of the ways in which institutions organize people inside the organization and the ways in which they direct their efforts towards the attainment of goals, as well as all the ways in which they try to influence outsiders. Everything from studying Constitutional level structuring (Madison, Federalist No. 10 and 51) to the understanding the rationale for the construction of parties (Van Buren, 1967 ; Aldrich 1995), to the political balance before the Civil War (Weingast, 1998), to the effect of regulator / industry relations on oil prices (Prindle, 1981) falls into this area of scholarship. All of these offer the opportunity to better understand how the American military institution operates within the larger liberal democratic institution of the United States as well as why certain illiberal ideas, such as minimizing the role of women and homosexuals in the military and obtaining intelligence by violating the usual search and seizure constraints, can operate hand in hand with liberal ideals of racial equality within the military and unselfish service to others.

Bringing APD into the discourse will enable political scientists to both better understand the military, to understand the relationship between civilians and the military, and possibly to prescribe conditions under which we might expect the correct relationship to break down. The breakdown of that relationship may well have had a serious impact on our decision to attack Iraq and the subsequent mismanagement of the war.