In order to deter an enemy from an undesirable course of action, or to coerce an action they might otherwise not pursue, a credible threat must be present. It is clear that nuclear weapons have offered valuable deterrence to general nuclear and major power war. It is less clear that nuclear weapons offer a credible response to anything much less than national survival. It is useful to look at the historical uses for which the United States has reserved nuclear weapons and how those used may (or may not) be valid exercises of deterrence or coercion.
In his 1996 book, Bombing to Win, Robert Pape made an extensive study of the role of coercion in war. He divided coercion into two categories: coercion by punishment and coercion by denial. Punishment, while not limited to attacking civilians and major population centers, operates by holding civilians and cities and risk. It can also take the form of creating huge casualties upon an enemy military force. Denial uses military means to keep an enemy from reaching its political, military, or territorial goals.[1]
Pape determined that there were differences in conventional and nuclear coercion. He summarized them with the following propositions:
Conventional Coercion:
- Punishment strategies rarely succeed. Inflicting enough pain to subdue the resistance of a determined adversary is normally beyond the capacity of conventional forces. Punishment strategies will work only when core values are at risk.
- Risk strategies will fail. They are diluted, and therefore weaker, versions of punishment.
- Denial strategies work best. They succeed if and when the coercer undermines the target state’s military strategy to control the specific territory in dispute.
- Surrender of homeland territory is especially unlikely. Nationalist sentiments demand resistance to foreign rule even when physical security cannot be guaranteed.
- Surrender terms that incorporate heavy additional punishment will not be accepted. There is no incentive to concede when the costs of surrender outweigh those of continued resistance. Societies that expect to become victims of genocide will not surrender.
- Coercive success almost always takes longer than the logic of either punishment or denial alone would suggest. Targets of coercion are usually slow to recognize the magnitudes of both increased civilian suffering and declining military prospects. Also, the domestic political costs of concessions encourage delay until the hopelessness of the situation becomes inescapably obvious. Even small hopes of success can cause coercion to fail.
Nuclear Coercion:
- Nuclear coercion requires superiority. If the target state has an assured destruction capability, any coercer is likely to be deterred.
- Denial strategies are not useful in nuclear disputes. The horrific levels of societal destruction in nuclear war are likely to so dominate decision making as to make the prospects for success or failure of military campaigns largely irrelevant.
- Risk strategies can be successful in nuclear disputes. Unlike conventional threats, nuclear threats raise the prospect of so much harm that they can coerce without being fully implemented.
- Nuclear punishment should be effective but rare. No target could resist. However, nuclear bombardment would not only reduce the value of the disputed territory, but would also earn the coercer a reputation for unparalleled barbarism.[2]
The propositions above imply that nuclear weapons are most effective when they threaten civilian populations with great harm, that is, in the coercion by punishment role. In such a role, leaders will likely be deterred from making decisions that run the risk of nuclear retaliation. On the other hand, in situations where denial is the object, conventional weapons appear to be the more effective. This becomes even more true in situations where it is unlikely that nuclear weapons will be used.
If Pape’s contentions are correct, that nuclear means are more effective for coercion by punishment and conventional weapons the more effective in coercion by denial, the uses for which the United States has reserved the right to use nuclear weapons may not be completely valid. Reviewing the list on page 1 above, the first two, 1) deter use of nuclear weapons against the United States, and 2) deter general conventional war between major powers, appear to be coercion by punishment. These are within the realm of effective use of nuclear weapons.
The remaining reasons, 3) defend against overwhelming conventional enemy force, 4) retaliate for use of biological and chemical weapons, 5) hardened deep underground bunkers, 6) satellites, 7) C4ISR systems, and 8) nuclear, biological, and chemical development sites, appear to fall into the coercion by denial category. With the possible exception of deterring use of biological and chemical weapons, (see discussion on the biological and chemical weapon problem, below) these categories appear to fall in the “denial” category. Effective conventional responses are available now, or are in development.
New conventional systems currently in various stages of production or research and development offer capabilities that can substitute for nuclear weapons on some missions. Air-launched cruise missiles and other precision guided munitions are currently under development by the Department of Defense. The Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW), the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), and the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Weapon, a longer ranged air launched PGM are currently available or on the immediate horizon.[3]
Particularly promising is the Fast Reaction Standoff Weapon (FRSW). The United States Air Force is funding research and development for a mach 8 “hypersonic” air-to-ground missile capable of responding to highly mobile, time-critical targets, and, potentially, hardened deep underground bunkers.[4]
Advanced research into miniaturized warheads with explosive power four to five times more powerful than available today may permit aircraft, UAVs, and missiles the ability to lift far more strike power per sortie.[5] With several times the strike power, General Fogleman’s predictions of 1500 or more targets struck in the first hour of an attack become achievable and approach strategic levels of speed and destruction.[6]
The United States Air Force has been developing unmanned aerial vehicles that promise loiter time measured in days rather than just hours. In 1996, the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board reported that “UAV platform, sensor, and weapons technology have all matured sufficiently to permit low risk, rapid, and low-cost development and application of weaponized UAVs in the near-term (1996-2005).” [7]
Electromagnetic pulse (EMP), a known side effect of nuclear explosions, is destructive to electronic equipment and is capable of affecting systems across a large area. The ability to generate EMP from conventional sources offers a method of disrupting enemy C4I networks and systems. High-power microwave (HPM) can produce similar destructive results and may even produce effects on personnel over an extended area.[8] Conventionally generated EMP and HPM, used as part of an electronic attack (EA), will increase ability to affect enemy C4ISR systems over broad areas without the negative aspects brought about by the use of nuclear weapons.
The Biological/Chemical Problem
The United States has defined biological and chemical weapons, along with nuclear weapons, as “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD). Since the United States eliminated its biological and chemical weapons programs, the stated policy has been to imply that the use of any WMD, whether nuclear, chemical, or biological, may expect a response by nuclear attack. While it is apparent that American leaders are reluctant to think about the use of nuclear weapons, there has been no reticence to discuss their potential use.
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy went out of his way to avoid the use of nuclear weapons. President Reagan, despite a strategy advocating the use of nuclear weapons as a tactical warfighting tool (e.g., NATO vs. USSR), wanted to find a way to eliminate nuclear weapons. President Bush decided early on in the Gulf War that he would not authorize the use of nuclear weapons. When such plans were discussed at the Department of Defense, they were quickly discarded.[9]
The intentions to not use nuclear weapons did not deter President Bush and Secretary of State Baker from threatening their use, however. When Iraq was suspected of having biological and chemical weapons, public and private statements were made linking any potential use of such weapons with a veiled threat of nuclear retaliation. While Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz stated that veiled threats of nuclear attack prevented the Iraqis from using their weapons in the Gulf War, it is more likely that other factors, such as the speed of the ground war and a general inability of the Iraqi command structure to function efficiently, was the actual reason.[10] The policy of privately not intending to use nuclear weapons, yet publicly threatening use was described by former Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, as “calculated ambiguity.”[11] The danger of this ambiguity is that an aggressive or risk-prone opponent may interpret such ambiguity as a lack of resolve.
With a growing sentiment that the potential for use of biological and chemical weapons is increasing, the United States must have a credible response that, while including nuclear weapons, does not require their use. Other than the first uses of chemical weapons in World War I, the only uses have been against essentially helpless victims. As long as a credible ability to respond, even conventionally, will probably deter use.[12]
The response to use of biological/chemical weapons use can take two forms. First, an attack on the leadership that made the decision. This has been the traditional realm of nuclear weapons. If, however, the U. S. leadership is unwilling to take that step, something equally as terrible must be available. Current conventional air strikes and cruise missile attacks are not sufficient.
Second, the response can be to attack the bio/chem weapon storage and development sites. A concern in this option is actually destroying the biological and chemical agents and avoiding spreading in an explosive cloud.
In both options above, the weapon currently available that offers both the “terrible-ness” and ability to actually destroy biological and chemical agents, is the fuel-air explosive (FAE). The fireball created by igniting a cloud of aerosol fuel will remove oxygen from the air, killing anyone in the area, create sufficient overpressure to knock down some buildings and nearby structures. Additionally, the heat is enough to sanitize biological agents and destroy or neutralize most chemical agents. The appearance and effect of a large FAE takes on a near-nuclear appearance (mushroom-like cloud) and has terrific destructive power without crossing the nuclear threshold.
The use of fuel-air-explosives has been controversial in some circles. Some hold that it is in contradiction to the Chemical Warfare Convention[13] and a violation of the Law of War. However, the United States has used the weapon in combat, most notably during Operation Desert Storm, and as recently as February 2001 reaffirmed it as being in the category of an incendiary device.
Hardened deep underground bunkers
Hardened Deep Underground Bunkers have presented a particularly difficult case for strategic targeting. Built into underground rock formations, such bunkers have been especially difficult to destroy by conventional means. Attempting to destroy the bunker directly with a ground penetrating, air dropped bomb has been the traditional method of attacking them. Heavy, hardened, conventional bombs have been used in the past with varying results.
The B-61-11 ground penetrating nuclear bomb, a variant of an existing nuclear gravity bomb, was developed during the 1990s to counter the difficult target. The bomb dropped from very high altitude results in a high velocity impact. Combined with a hardened case, it can penetrate several feet underground. With an underground explosion, most of the explosive power is coupled to the earth causing greater destructive power being transmitted to the buried bunker.
The British have been experimenting with hypersonic (mach 8 plus) missiles that promise an ability to penetrate the earth and impart sufficient explosive power to affect underground facilities. The missile’s multiple warheads are timed very carefully to hit the earth in sequence. The first warheads remove any covering soil, which is a particularly good dampener of shock. Subsequent warheads strike the rock and penetrate with a superheated blast similar to HEAT rounds that melt their way through tank armor. A series of such warheads can penetrate well into the rock structure and impart sufficient shock to destroy or at least incapacitate the underground facility.[14]
Other methods are available to attack underground bunkers that do not involve explosive attack on the integrity of the facility itself. Existing methods can be used to attack the life support or communications systems. Once the underground bunkers have been located, photoanalysts and engineers will be able to identify the ventilation systems, power grid, and communications cables. Ventilation ducts, underground power or communications cables can be located by overhead means and attacked with PGMs. Additionally, electronic attack against known communications networks can render the personnel inside the bunker incapable of communicating. The special warfare community has recently been cooperating with STRATCOM to determine other methods of attacking and/or neutralizing HDUBs.
Part 1: http://bit.ly/cyBrjn
Part 2: http://bit.ly/b8NJ2s
Part 4: http://bit.ly/b8lEnf
[1] Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 13.
[2] Ibid., p. 20.
[3] Andrew Krepinevich, and Stephen Kosiak, “Smarter Bombs, Fewer Nukes” The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Winter 1998/1999 (November 1998). This article has been published elsewhere under the title “The Military Revolution and the Case for Deep Cuts in Nuclear Forces.” Many of the items noted in following paragraphs were cited in this article, a very good summary of how to replace nuclear weapons with conventional munitions and other technology.
[4] See Robert Wall and David Fulghum, “Combat Weakness Triggers New Research,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 16, 1998, p. 25.
[5] Krepinevich, “Smarter Bombs, Fewer Nukes”, p. 6.
[6] General Ronald R. Fogleman, “Getting the Air Force into the 21st Century,” Speech delivered to the Air Force Association’s Air Warfare Symposium (Orlando, FL: 24 February 1995). See also Krepinevich, “Smarter Bombs, Fewer Nukes,” p. 3. Krepinevich argues “If, as General Fogleman seems to imply, it is possible to deploy a conventional precision strategic strike capability that can be employed with the speed and effectiveness approaching that of a nuclear strike, it may constitute an irresistible option for those military organizations that can afford to develop such forces and organizations.”
[7] United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Report on UAV Technologies and Combat Operations. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1996).
[8] Board on Army Science and Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council, Star 21 Technology Forecast Assessments: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1993), p. 503.
[9] Colin L. Powell with Joseph E. Perisco, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. 485-486
Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney asked the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, to examine possible nuclear strike options. "To do serious damage to just one armored division dispersed in the desert would require a considerable number of small tactical nuclear weapons. I showed this analysis to Cheney and then had it destroyed.”
[10] Stephen I. Schwartz, “Miscalculated Ambiguity: U. S. Policy on the Use and Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons.” Disarmament Diplomacy. The Brookings Institute, February 1998, p. 2.
[11] William Arkin, “Calculated Ambiguity: Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf War.” Washington Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 4, Autumn 1996, pp. 3018.
[12] Keith B. Payne, “Deterring the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Lessons from History.” Comparative Strategy, vol. 14, October 1995, pp. 347-359. Despite the availability of such weapons, neither Germany nor Japan used the bio/chem weapons against the United States in World War II. In the cases where it was used (e.g., Italian use against Ethiopia in 1935, Japanese use against Chinese beginning in 1937, Egyptian use against Yemen in 1967, and Iraqi use against Kurds in the 1990s) the target was essentially helpless to respond to the attack.
[13] The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC), entered into force on 29 April 1997. It has been signed and ratified by 123 countries, including the United States. 48 other countries are not signatory, including Egypt, Eritrea, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, and Syria.
[14] Thomas C. Linn, “U.K.-made bomb offers U.S. conventional long-range missile that destroys bunkers.” National Defense, vol. 82, no. 535 (February 1998), pp. 16-17.