CivMilBlog

The entire logic behind bombing Iran is an assumption that it is possible to actually stop their nuclear program by such action.  It can’t be done.  Bombing a country from the air has not, cannot, and will not force it to submit to force.  It could not be done in World War I when the concept was brand new.  It could not be done in World War II when the most serious attempts were made.  It could not be done in Vietnam when the US attempted to influence Hanoi on many occasions.  It could not be done in Kosovo, despite rumors to the contrary.

Air power is important.  A good case can be made that one cannot win a conventional war without air power, but a case cannot be made that conventional war can be won by air power alone.  With the apparent buildup to making a case for bombing Iran in the near future over their nuclear program, it becomes very important to understand what the adherents to such a plan have in mind.  It appears that plans are being made to bomb several thousand aim points to convince Iran to stop their nuclear program.

Bombing several thousand aim points will create a lot of damage.  It will not destroy the nuclear program, or at least we cannot guarantee we can destroy the nuclear program.  It will not convince the Iranians to stop their program.  If history is to tell us anything, it will merely cause them to redouble efforts and make their program even harder to destroy.  No country has ever been bombed into submission.  It cannot be done, now.  What bombing will do is to set the entire Middle East, including our friends, against us.  The United States will hand China and Russia a great opportunity to step into a vacuum and gain influence in the region to the detriment of America.

It may be a bad thing for Iran to have a nuclear weapon, but it is a worse thing to think that bombing Iran will fix the problem.  It will merely make things worse and certainly not solve the problem.

The New York Times ad by MoveOn.org portraying General Petraeus as potentially betraying America continues and threatens to exacerbate a trend that has developed over the past thirty years.  Democrats have slowly, but surely, alienated themselves from the military.  While words of “support for the troops” and “we are patriots, too” are all very likely true, the hard truth is that a strong majority of the military population believes that the Democratic Party does not have the best interests of the American military in mind and, at the extreme, hates the military. This unfortunate circumstance poses serious problems for American civil-military relations over the next decade.

The heavy percentage of military and active reserve leaders identify as moderate or somewhat moderate while more civilians, both veteran and non-veteran, identify themselves as moderate to somewhat liberal. In 1976, the Foreign Policy Leadership Project survey found that 55 percent of respondents self-identified as independents, other, or none. By 1996 that number had shrunk to 28 percent of active duty and 27 percent of reservists.[1] In 1999, about two-thirds of the officer corps self-identified as Republican compared to about one third for the general population. Less than ten percent of the officer corps identifies as Democrat in contrast to about one third of the general population. [2]

Peter Feaver of Duke University, writing in the Washington Post, observed that this pattern was, to some extent, self-inflicted. It appears that even when trying to do what they honestly believe is the right thing to do for America, the way Democrats say it somehow appears to demean the military.

Despite an extraordinary effort to woo the military, the Democrats still have not overcome their traditional tone-deafness when it comes to civil-military relations.[3]

Much has been written on this, beginning with some of the well-known incidents in the early years of Clinton’s presidency. Many wrote it off as a specific problem of that particular administration. However, Feaver appears to be correct and if the Democrats want to regain control of the White House and provide civilian control of the military in something resembling a healthy environment, the Democratic Party is going to have to change some of the ways they do business.

Since the departure of Sam Nunn (D-GA) from the Senate in 1996, Democrats in Congress have few members who have any expertise in Defense. Ike Skelton (D-MO) and John Murtha (D-PA) may be the only Democrats with any recognizable expertise in military matters. Some Democratic members have active duty or National Guard military experience, but that number is small compared to a few decades ago. If the Democrats want to regain authority in the defense area, they have work to do.

Kurt Campbell and Michael O?Hanlon have recently published a recipe for Democratic resurgence in defense matters. Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security offers some policy recommendations to what they describe as hard power Democrats and moderate Republicans.[4] It is well worth reading.

Whether or not one is a partisan Democrat, the specter of one party having the appearance of being the enemy of the military cannot be good for American civil-military relations. More Democrats need to take time to understand the military and develop and expertise in military matters.  It is patently unhealthy for the United States to have a military favoring one political party over the other.  Such a pathology left unchecked can lead to serious repercussions.

Feaver and Gelpi have repeatedly told us that there is a very real difference in the way the military and civilians view the use of force.[5] They also note that civilians, both veterans and non-veterans, who have been more closely associated with the military (familial or professional association) or who have enrolled in Professional Military Education courses (the war colleges) take on a deeper understanding of the military and on the use of military force. Such association brings with it a deeper respect for the military.  With respect come a better capability of working together despite differences of opinion.

There is a very real possibility that a Democrat is going to sit in the White House following the 2008 elections. If attitudes don’t change between Democrats and the military we stand to have some tense times between the Pentagon senior leadership and the executive branch in early 2009. While I am not predicting anything along the lines of a military coup, inattention will lead to serious divisions in government that can have serious impact on national security.  I urge more attention to this on the part of all, but especially those in the Democratic Party who are in a position to influence such attitudes and behavior.

[1] Ole R. Holsti. Of Chasms and Convergences: Attitudes and Beliefs of Civilians and Military Elites at the Start of a New Millennium, in Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds., Soldiers and Civilians. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001. .

[2] James A. Davis. Attitudes and Opinions Among Senior Military Officers and a U. S. Cross Section, 1998-99, in Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds., Soldiers and Civilians. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001.

[3] Peter D. Feaver. Whose Military Vote? Washington Post, Oct 21, 2004, p. A23.

[4] Kurt Campbell and Michael O’Hanlon. Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security. New York: Basic Books, 2006

[5] Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi. Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force.nbsp; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.

The recent (well done) article in Foreign Affairs by Michael Desch on the state of American civil military relations brought forth some strong and equally well written counter attacks by General Myers, Richard Kohn, and Mackubin Owens.  This sort of very public argument is desperately needed.  The last such debate occurred in the 1990s when a number of scholars were worried that the post-Cold War situation had created a civil-military crisis in America.  The difference then was that the argument was largely confined to academic circles.  While this debate is certainly more read in such circles, Foreign Affairs is more widely read than most academic journals.

This is a needed debate.  How to balance the necessary civilian control of the military and provide the right amount of political guidance to the use of military force without dangerous intrusion into purely military matters is important.  The argument falls around two primary camps.  The first is largely a Huntington-based camp in which there are analytically separate civilian and military worlds.  The civilian world determines and manages the strategy and gives orders to the military world.  Then, the military world is left largely free to execute the necessary operations and tactics to meet the political guidance.  The second camp, a bit more skeptical of how things actually work in the real world, and heavily influenced by the Vietnam debacle, advocates more interaction between the two worlds and even requires the military world to push back against the civilian world if the guidance seems misplaced or dangerous.

Desch is certainly of the latter camp while Myers, Kohn, and Owens are less so, perhaps even of the Huntington camp.  The critics of Desch are worried that too much military criticism of civilian leadership is at least borderline insubordination.  Certainly public criticism is seen that way.  Indeed, the education I had while serving 28 years in the Navy told me to criticize and argue (in private) until the order was given.  Then, it was necessary to salute and obey.  If I was unable to do that then it was my duty to resign my commission.

The bottom line is that public debate over the correct balance between civilian and military authority is absolutely necessary.  Even Eliot Cohen, hardly a Huntingtonian, calls the argument “the uneven dialogue,” meaning that in the end, the military must give way to the civilian authority, and ultimately the civilian authority is the only one who has the right to be wrong.

Keep arguing and continue the debate.  I suspect that part of the reason we made many of the mistakes in the current war in Iraq (the decision to go in the first place and the management of it since) was due to too little civilian control of the military during the Clinton years followed by too much (or inappropriate) control of the military (or perhaps a poor reaction on the part of the military to such control) during the Bush administration.  Getting the balance right means that we must be able, at a minimum, recognize when the balance is not right.  We only find that out by debate, usually in the bright unforgiving light of public discourse.

As reported by Military Times, most are now aware that the U. S. Air Force unknowingly transported six nuclear weapons on a B-52 bomber from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale AFB in Louisiana.  This means, necessarily, that for some period of time those six weapons were not under control, at least not under the sort of two person control that nuclear weapons and nuclear related items are normally under.  Since they thought they were transporting six demilitarized cruise missiles, probably Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM N), it is likely that the bomber crew had no idea they were transporting nuclear weapons.  So, there were no normal nuclear security precautions on board the aircraft.  This was a huge loss of security and undoubtedly several careers will be ended over this incident.

Having said that, we flew nuclear weapons over the United States for decades without incident, so there is little need to get overly upset.  However, this does bring up an interesting discussion about nuclear weapon control that Peter Feaver often discusses in his writing on nuclear proliferation.  He argues that we must control further proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology because many of the countries that have such weapons or want such weapons have pathologies in their civil military relations.  That means there are serious issues with the ability of the military to be adequately controlled by the civilian authority.

What does that have to do with this case.  No one seriously believes that six nucs got lost over America and they threatened world peace.  What it points out is that in a country with air tight security over nuclear weapons we can experience a lapse.  How much more likely is it in a country with a poor record of such security (e.g., Russia, Pakistan) for such incidents to occur.

Nuclear terrorism is a serious issue and incidents like this must keep us ever vigilant to ensure we keep the reins very tight on nucs, not just here, but across the globe.

You might also be interested in this research paper I put together a while back on the influence of Congress on American naval policy.

http://inbody.net/docs/CongressNavyInbody.pdf

Some interest in the field of American civil military relations has sparked further interest in reading.  I put together an annotated bibliography based on a list provided to me by Peter Feaver (Duke University).  I hope you find it interesting.  Some new things have come out or been located since, but this provides an excellent starting point for the early student of the field.

http://inbody.net/docs/BibInbody.pdf

American civil-military relations are not well studied within political science. Even the trauma of Vietnam failed to instigate much creative research. The collapse of colonial empires and the increase of military coups in parts of the world initiated significant interest by comparativists in third world civil-military relations and he recent fall of the Soviet Union has energized research on Eastern European matters, but despite some excellent work in the sociological field (Janowitz, 1971; Moskos, 1988), little has been done by political scientists with American civil-military relations.

Huntington’s classic Soldier and the State (1957), while not the first study of civil military relations in the United States following World War II, certainly had the most impact. He worried about the sudden presence of a post war large standing army, something not before seen in American history, posed a theory of civil-military relations of separate civilian and military worlds. Assuming the civilian politicians were the masters of the military world, it also assumed that a professional, apolitical military would have a free hand within its own world. By this separate military professionalism the civil military problematique (maintaining a military effective enough to defend the state yet not able to threaten the state) would be solved. Later, Feaver (1997) would challenge Huntington’s understanding of Cold War civil-military relations by asking whether Huntington’s predictions actually came true and offered a theory based on agency theory.

Feaver’s agency theory begins with an institutional approach to studying American civil-military relations. He examines the relationship between the civilian authorities and the military leadership. Comparing historical events to his theory then enable one to understand under which conditions the military will “work” (do the administrations bidding) or “shirk” (do what is in the military’s own best interests. Other study reveals that gaps in the attitudes of civilians and military officers may explain much as to why the military will follow orders when some might expect them to not obey. This will reveal itself in the decision to go to war in Iraq.

There it sits, though, with little progress. With the war in Iraq facing us now and the future (and probably inappropriately named) “Global War on Terror,” issues relating to the relations between the civilian political authorities and the military leadership have already caused a stir. APD offers a unique method to explore how our past may provide a means to find the future. APD’s overall strength lies in holding that politics are historically constructed and that institutions, as well as their development, explain much. It sees history as more than just a source of data. “History matters.” Timing and sequence (Pierson, 2000) are important and may well provide a key to understanding politics. Micro views, such as behavioralism produces, often hide the larger picture. Institutions and power arrangements independently affect political outcomes. Thus, in the civil-military world, studying the institutions and the dynamics created by them will provide insight to the solution.

Bringing APD into the discourse will enable political scientists to both better understand the military, to understand the relationship between civilians and the military, and possibly to prescribe conditions under which we might expect the correct relationship to break down. The breakdown of that relationship may well have had a serious impact on our decision to attack Iraq and the subsequent mismanagement of the war.

A credibility gap exists between the threat of nuclear weapons and current conventional capability. While there is little doubt that adversaries take American possession of nuclear weapons seriously for the deterrence of nuclear and major power war, there is room to question U. S. willingness to use them for anything short of an “enemy-at-the-gates” scenario. A case can be made that nuclear weapons are useful in deterring use of biological and chemical weapons, but there is an apparent lack of willingness on the part of U. S. leaders to actually commit to crossing the nuclear threshold. Bringing existing and “on-the-horizon” technologies into the strategic arena will add to the credibility of American resolve and allow more flexibility of response.

The belief that nuclear weapons are a credible threat becomes even more problematic in proposing them as a counter to hardened deep underground bunkers, satellites (weaponized or surveillance), or terror activity, whether state- or non-state sponsored. For the United States to maintain a credible threat to respond to the specialized targets and in response to use of WMD, non-nuclear options are required.

A bullet that never fired is just extra weight in the cartridge belt. Similarly, a bullet that an opponent does not believe will ever be fired is an ineffective tool for deterrence. For American power to be credible across the full spectrum of threats, a reasonable belief that such power will be exercised must exist. A conventional, believable force must be available.

Advances in munitions and guidance technology offer the United States strategic deterrence options beyond those provided by nuclear weapons alone. A broad range of powerful munitions, combined with the exceptionally accurate delivery methods provided by the Global Positioning System (GPS), terrain mapping radar, and laser terminal guidance, provide useful and credible force that can provide the same or similar effects as a nuclear weapon with fewer political drawbacks. Future advances in doctrine and technology promise to increase the effectiveness of such weapons.

Nuclear proliferation has been a nightmare scenario since the end of World War II. The thought of nuclear annihilation was a constant focusing mechanism during the Cold War. However, it appeared to be a manageable issue when the only two countries with such weapons were the United States and the Soviet Union. With more and more countries obtaining nuclear weapons, or threatening to obtain nuclear weapons, the worry that such proliferation may get out of control, and, more seriously, that such weapons might get into the hands of extremist groups bent on violence, posed a frightening possibility.

The genie is out of the bottle. Involuntary non-proliferation is not possible. Should a state (or non-state actor for that matter) want to develop a nuclear weapon, there is little that can be done forcibly to stop it. Therefore, another avenue needs to be found. On the surface this seems impossible, which may explain the calls for military action to destroy the potential nuclear weapons program in Iran. However, recent surprising “victories” in the nuclear non-proliferation struggle may provide some insight into future policy.

The avenues of non-proliferation are these: (1) eliminate the ability of potential proliferators to obtain nuclear technology, (2) destroy (voluntarily or involuntarily) nuclear technology when found, (3) and convince those with nuclear weapons (or those who might want them) to stop their search. As implied by the question, the first two are problematic at best and most likely impossible.

Treaties to limit proliferation have appeared to work to some extent, but rely on voluntary actions. Indeed, most of the countries who have signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty have little realistic ability to ever achieve nuclear technology in the first place, so it would certainly be in their best interests to eliminate proliferation. However, since the development of nuclear technology is essentially an open science, it is not difficult for any well funded organization to obtain the necessary information and technological equipment. It is not surprising that advanced, modern states like South Africa and Israel were able to build nuclear weapons, but the fact that Pakistan could is reason for pause. If they can develop a nuclear weapon, little can stop anyone from doing so. Indeed, now we see North Korea with at least one and Iran apparently well on the way to developing a weapons program.

The destruction of nuclear weapons or the locations where they are being developed is also limited in efficacy. There is essentially no way to achieve perfect assurance that one knows exactly where the weapons are, that if one did attack that all were actually destroyed, and that retaliation of such an attack might be a nuclear counterattack (Turner, 1999, 2000).

Several writers have offered a view that proliferation of nuclear weapons might actually create a safer world (Waltz, 1981; Weltman, 1980; Mearsheimer, 1990). These scholars, principally neo-realists, argue that “nuclear weapons, amplify and thereby render inviolable the constraints upon untoward behaviour that the condition of anarchy alone engenders (Woods, 2002).” As a result of this strengthening of the system, the international system will stabilize and, within this structure, a “nuclear peace” will ensue. The view of these early proponents of “proliferation optimism” has been lately termed “paleo-optimism” and has been subjected to much criticism. Central among the critics is Peter Feaver.

Feaver (1993) divided the world of nuclear proliferation theory into two camps; optimists and pessimists. Additionally, coining the term “paleo-optimists” to label the early theories of Kenneth Waltz (1981), he set the two schools apart and brought the argument into the forefront. Feaver believes that Karl (1996-1997) and Seng (1997) were able to demonstrate that paleo-optimism (Sagan &Waltz, 1995) has been overtaken by a “new consensus about the determinants of nuclear behavior.” He sees civil-military pathologies existent in various states that undermine command and control of nuclear weapons, thereby keeping them dangerous and unpredictable even with policies that limit their use. A small state that might see itself as a potential victim of a preventive war, may well drive it to, first, obtain nuclear weapons to provide a certain amount of safety, and, second, permit it to adopt (or at least allow) unsafe control and operational practices. Such unsafe practices will likely yield a more unpredictable and therefore dangerous world.

One option presented in some quarters is for the present nuclear powers, beginning with the United States, to eliminate all nuclear weapons, at least all but a few, as a first sign of good intentions. While on the surface this might seem like opening the door to enemies, writers such as Stansfield Turner have argued that only a few nuclear weapons are sufficient to hold the world hostage. Additionally, to induce the political and military leaders that such a move is not dangerous to national security, he has suggested that there are conventional alternatives to all missions and targets traditionally reserved for nuclear weapons (Turner, 1999, 2000; Inbody, 2001).

So, if treaties alone are not adequate, it is impossible to eliminate the information leading to the technology, and the destruction of existing nuclear weapons is at best problematic, the only solution would seem to be finding a way to convince potential proliferators that possession of a nuclear weapon is not in their best interests. Such voluntary elimination of nuclear weapons and development programs is certainly no easy task, but we have two recent events that may give us some cause for hope.

On 19 December 2003, the Libyan government announced that it would eliminate its nuclear development program and would allow international inspections of its weapon sites. The announcement was the result of secret negations with the United States and the United Kingdom that had begun in March 2003. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Mohamed El Baradei took a team of inspectors to Libya by the end of the year and had unrestricted access to the nuclear development sites.

Recent progress with North Korea on talks to end their nuclear program has also been reason for hope. President Clinton declared in 1993 that North Korea “cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb.” Later declarations by the Defense Department stated that “we will not let the North Koreans become a nuclear power. . . . nuclear weapons in the hands of North Korea is not acceptable.” Clinton’s defense policy concluded that the spread of weapons of mass destruction posed the most direct threat to U.S. post-Cold War security interests (Karl, 1997).

Despite such bellicose verbiage, we have come a long ways since then. One country developing nuclear weapons (Libya) has been convinced to stop. Another country that has at exploded on small (probably 1 kiloton) weapon (North Korea) has apparently been induced to negotiate its capability away for other more important considerations. These are hopeful signs.

These two events raise the possibility that under the right circumstances, it is possible to find a state voluntarily giving up nuclear weapons. The question, then, is what is at the root of the nuclear weapon program and how will potential differences in desires be addressed. We must explore why any country wants to (1) obtain and (2) keep a nuclear weapons program.

From a realist point of view, it offers security and power relative to its neighbors. It also seems to offers a certain kind of legitimacy in the world as possessing nuclear weapons makes one part of the “nuclear club” and thereby an entity that cannot be ignored. However, if behind the desire for nuclear weapons is not a desire for domination or expansion, but actually a desire to just be considered a legitimate part of the international community, there may be room for cooperation.

The theories of the offensive and defensive realists seem to offer some insight. Offensive realists such as Mearsheimer, see little room for increasing cooperation. Aggressors can be deterred or defeated, but to think that increasing the information intercourse between states might change the calculus is not within the realm of possibility. Changing incentives may change the discourse, but will likely only yield benefits for one side. Defensive realists, however, see more reason for optimism. Here they agree with neo-liberals that if large transactions can be divided into smaller ones, then transparency can be increased, thereby keeping the gains from cheating and the costs of being cheated low. Under these circumstances mutual cooperation can be made more likely to continue over time (Jervis, 1978; Keohane, 1984; ; Axelrod, 1984; Oye, 1986; Jervis, 1999).

The problem seems to be reducing the issues facing the United States, and presumably other great powers, to figure out how to divide the issues faced by the potential and minor proliferators, and engage in talks to solve them in detail. Solving the details ultimately, albeit slowly, results in a larger, likely more long lasting solution. That does appear to be what has been going on with North Korea. Kim Jong Il may not actually have desired the absolute power that results from nuclear weapons. He may only have wanted security for his state and to sit at the table with the world powers and be taken seriously. If North Korea can be convinced that the United States will permit them to sit at the table and if they can be convinced that it is not in the interests of the United States to attack North Korea, they may well be induced to give up the nuclear program in exchange for security. Kaddafi apparently wanted to ensure that his successor, presumably his son, would be in a situation whereby Libya would not be isolated from the international community. Since the real desire of Kaddafi was to be part of the international arena, isolating that issue from others, i.e., dividing transactions into smaller, more easily devoured bites, it became possible to negotiate a successful result of eliminating nuclear weapons in at least one country.

The specter of nuclear weapons in the hands of extremist groups is frightening. Possession of nuclear weapons by Pakistan and the potential possession by Iran raise fears of transferring the weapons to such groups’ hands, either deliberately or inadvertently. This makes it all the more important to find ways to engage those states that already have nuclear weapons to ensure the safety and security of the weapons in the first place, and to increase the likelihood that the command and control of such weapons are secure and not open to failure or sloppy procedure.

Wendt presents a powerful argument about social interaction on an international scale (xiii). He purports to describe a mechanism whereby states (and presumably other international actors) operate within an anarchical background to create various types and levels of systems. He is quite sure that what he is describing is, in fact, an international system of its own. Unfortunately, while much of what he describes and explains is true, he fails to demonstrate that his social theory operates on any level other than between two individual units. If this is true, then Wendt has presented less a theory of international politics than a theory of foreign relations.

He is not satisfied with liberal or neo-liberal theories in that they arise from a structure common with realism. Realists and liberals all agree that the background in which international politics operate is anarchical and that such anarchy necessarily yields a “self-help” system. States compete in this system trading in power and security. Wendt agrees that the background is anarchical, but is unconvinced that anarchy is a system or structure in and of itself. He understands anarchy as a void in which there is no form or structure. Systems and structures can only arise through the constructive social actions of humankind (249). While the realist competitive “self-help” structure could arise in such a world, Wendt believes it is only one of several possibilities, many of which could be operating simultaneously. Thus, Wendt agrees with realists that the “original state” of international politics is anarchy, but he disagrees that it necessarily must create a hostile environment.

The notion of just what anarchy is and means for the international system is critical to the argument. It would appear to be the fundamental difference in how Constructivists and Realists understand the world. If anarchy is just a void without form and structure, then it makes sense that social interactions between humans will provide such structures. If, however, one believes that with anarchy comes a pre-ordained set of “laws” that arise from such a condition, then the actions of humans become constrained by the IR version of physics.

An analogy: Both Wendt and the Realists agree that “in the beginning” there was a void, i.e., anarchy. However, Wendt would say that the Realists believe there is an IR “god” who set forth certain systems from that void. Humans were thus limited to what they could do by those “laws.” Wendt would say there is no IR “god” and the people created all the structures through iterative social interaction. Such a “godless” view permits the idealist to imagine how things can change and describe a system in which the future can look significantly different than the present (or the past.) The Realist says that such ideal “godless” notions are at best pointless and at worst dangerous, as such a view makes possible assumptions about the “real” world that are false, can never be true, and can lead to making decisions that lead to dangerous results. The Idealist says we have a dangerous world, but we can work through it and evolve into a less dangerous world. The Realist says we live in a dangerous world and only by fully understanding that and not making false assumptions can we remain relatively secure.

If Wendt is correct that his social theory is indeed a theory of international politics, he must show that actors within that system are somehow driven or constrained by that system. The system must be shown to have an effect on the decisions each unit in the structure makes. If it does not, and each unit is unconstrained, then he has described further anarchy in an already anarchical system.

Wendt worries about the limitations of Waltz’s structure in that it does not allow sufficiently for the effects of interaction between units (146). He spends considerable time discussing “micro-structure” postulating that interactions are “structured by…desires, beliefs, strategies, and capabilities…” of the various units, states for the most part (148).

Wendt theorizes three cultures of anarchy: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. From these cultures, he envisions a culture in which units are, respectively, enemies, competitors, and friends. He describes a system in which it is possible for an individual state to be in all three relations simultaneously with various other units. This certainly helps in understanding why the United States would choose not to invade the Bahamas or even Mexico even though the balance of power would indicate that nothing could stop the U. S. should it so choose. It does not, however, tell us why any given state would react in a given way. It only describes how a state might react. It also does not discuss how this is a system that drives the international arena in a way more satisfying than the Realists.

Wendt is helpful by answering a critique of Waltz and other realists; states are under-defined in realist theory. He is certain that one must take internal domestic politics into account in order to provide the best understanding of how the international politic actually operates. If one assumes each state to be a “black box” then it would appear to matter little what was in each box to explain international politics. Observation seems to tell us the “black box” theory is not completely accurate, as such a view would seem to equate a state run as a dictatorship and one run as a democracy. Wendt delves into this problem and opines that domestic issues, ideas, and interests drive how each state will interact with others and not some hidden law drawn up by the “IR god.”

The “black box” idea has its merits, though, in assisting the student in understanding how the overall system works. When learning to understand how a radio works, the beginner “black boxes” or draws “equivalent circuits” to show the design. One only needs to know that a radio needs an antenna, a detector, and an output. The specifics of those “black boxes” are irrelevant to the understanding of how the radio works. It is understood, however, that one cannot actually build a radio with equivalent circuits. Indeed, there are multiple ways to design and build the antennas, detectors, and outputs, but that does not change the overall theory of how the receiver works.

Waltz and the realists with him have described a system theory that works and describes more than it does not. Wendt is delving deeper into the inner workings of the black boxes, not satisfied with the equivalent circuits to help him understand how international politics works. Wendt describes social interaction well. He does not, however, describe an international system. He shows how any individual international actor could decide to interact with any other actor. He works at analytical levels far below that of the Realists, and by operating at such a “micro” level he brings so many variables into the equation as to make it essentially unworkable. With an unworkable algorithm he presents us with a theory that provides little more than a description of states interacting. We already knew they interacted and his theory does little to help us understand why they interact the way they do. He tells us that different states can decide to be friends, competitors, or enemies. Thus, he describes reasonably well the foreign policy options a given state may take, but not an international system that limits or drives those decisions.